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I.

Abstract
Baseball fans discuss and remember the heroics of Major League Baseball players and

managers. However, team executives operate away from the crowds, in the front office to draft,
trade for, and sign talented players and managers to construct successful teams. The intent of this
thesis is to first rank and analyze these general managers and presidents of baseball operations
through finance and baseball statistics. Then, I will examine team statistics to determine what
statistics correlate to winning. Two of the general managers, Theo Epstein and Dan O’Dowd,
will then be examined more thoroughly to determine how their decisions impacted their
respective teams. Ultimately, this paper will conclude with an assertion that the strategic actions
of upper level executives in Major League Baseball directly positively and negatively impact the
performance of their teams.
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II.

Introduction
Major League Baseball (hereafter referred to as “the MLB” or “MLB”) has a storied

legacy. Countless videos, articles, and books have been created on championship teams, gutsy
managers, and the greatest players of all time.1 2 3 These managers and players contribute
directly to their respective teams, providing measurable statistics that determine their efficiency,
ability, and intellect. However, these managers and players are not randomly assigned to their
teams. They are drafted, signed, traded for, and hired by higher-level executives within each
organization. These executives operate behind the scenes, draw far fewer headlines than the
managers and players, and, until Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics was recognized for his
ability,4 were not recognized for their success other than receiving World Series rings from their
owners. This thesis will bring baseball executives to the forefront, arguing that their actions
greatly determine the success of the team on a season-to-season or game-to-game basis.
The teams’ owners are the bosses of each organization. They are responsible for hiring
immediate inferiors to manage the team’s finances and baseball operations. They are CEOs,
presidents, and entrepreneurs, making their money outside of baseball before purchasing a MLB
team as a long-term investment or expensive hobby. As a result, owners do not possess expert
knowledge in baseball statistics, free agent signings, or evaluating high school, collegiate, and
international talent. This is precisely why they hire general managers and presidents of baseball

1

Montville, Leigh. The Big Bam: The Life and Times of Babe Ruth.
Joe Torre and Tom Verducci. The Yankee Years.
3
Verducci, Tom. The Cubs Way: The Zen of Building the Best Team in Baseball and Breaking the Curse.
4
Lewis, Michael. Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game.
2
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operations. These are the executives who work tirelessly to employ the team’s budget to create
competitive teams.
Presidents of baseball operations rank higher than general managers if the two positions
exist within the same organization. The title “president of baseball operations” has only recently
been invented and is designed to promote existing general managers instead of releasing them to
sign a contract with another team. Fewer than half of the MLB teams currently employ both a
president of baseball operations and a general manager.
Presidents of baseball operations occupy the same role as general managers on teams that
do not employ a president of baseball operations. These two jobs are very similar and, as will be
explained in the first empirical section, having a president of baseball operations working with a
general manager does not correlate with a higher win total. Therefore, these two positions are
charged with the same task from their owner: Create the most competitive baseball team possible
within the resources (budget) available.
Baseball is not a fair game. There is no salary cap that teams must stay under to ensure
that every team pays their players the same amount. Instead, teams rule baseball through their
wallets. The New York Yankees, Boston Red Sox, and Los Angeles Dodgers have larger budgets
from richer owners and greater revenue from merchandise, media contracts, and ticket sales due
to residing in larger market cities. As a result, general managers for teams with less money are
severely handicapped and are forced to find and draft talented players who succeed before their
first large MLB contract, or trade for cheaper players who “fly under the radar” and provide
success when other teams believe they are not capable. Essentially, teams with lower budgets
must take higher risks on unproven, younger players and hope they become successful, while
rich teams can throw money at proven all-stars in the offseason.

7

This thesis will attempt to provide answers to the question: How do you evaluate the
success of a general manager and/or president of baseball operations? The two answers to that
question are: Base their success on their total wins or on their cost per win. Teams with low
budgets have succeeded and won World Series, but for the most part they are more likely to lose
games. However, a general manager who can win more games with a lower budget shows that he
knows how to evaluate, develop, and manage talent exceptionally well and cost-effectively.
In order to understand executive success in building winning teams, I will analyze
various baseball statistics (hits, home runs, etc.) and determine whether they are correlated with
the total number of regular season wins. These three regressions will determine which statistics
or types of players are more beneficial to teams, providing a clearer picture of the factors general
managers should focus on. Some variables are strongly correlated with team victories, while
other variables commonly viewed as critical to a team are, in fact, not correlated.
Finally, I will provide a case study on two executives, Theo Epstein and Dan O’Dowd, to
juxtapose the transactions of a “highly successful” general manager with an “unsuccessful” one.
These transactions will enable me to paint a complete picture of the activities of the two general
managers, analyzing in depth more than would be possible with only data on general managers
and team statistics.
On a larger scale, the goal of this thesis is to analyze upper management in an
organization. All companies have upper level executives whose success can only be measured
through the company value or annual revenue. Baseball provides vast amounts of data with
which to analyze the success of its executives. Additionally, baseball is a sport with a winner and
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a loser, pitting two executives against one another every game. This sport allows me to analyze
executives in far greater depth than in any other business sector.5

There will be no “Literature Review” section in this thesis. Instead, I will discuss literary sources before the two
empirical analysis sections and the case study.
5
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III.

Data Review
I created the data set for the first regression from numerous sources while combining

sixteen seasons of data for the second empirical analysis section. The data for both analysis
sections describes the last seventeen years of the MLB, from 2000 to 2016. This provides 30
teams’ data over seventeen years, resulting in 510 observations for every variable, producing in a
large sample size.
The most difficult and time-consuming process in data collection was acquiring the
names of every general manager and president of baseball operations since 2000. There is no
database that lists every one of these in spreadsheet form. Additionally, individual teams do not
have a history of their executives on their websites. Thus, my process for obtaining this
information began through Wikipedia. Wikipedia has, for every MLB team, a page titled “List of
[MLB team’s] owners and executives.”6 From there, I looked up the team’s current front office
to obtain information on their executive positions.7 There, I saw that, if a team had a “president
of baseball operations,” he was either listed as such or as one of a few similar titles, like
“Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations,” or “Vice President, Baseball Operations.”
These titles varied from team to team, but their job description remained the same. Therefore,
these men were treated as the same under the category “president of baseball operations.”
After establishing the two categories “general manager” and “president of baseball
operations,” I visited each teams’ “List of [MLB team’s] owners and executives” Wikipedia page
again, clicking on each individual executive to record when they began and ended their career

6
7

“List of San Francisco Giants owners and executives.” Wikipedia.
Front Office Directory.” San Francisco Giants.
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with the team. I recognize that Wikipedia is a fan-edited page, thus I visited each of the sources
to confirm the validity of the information. I will not cite each of these sources, as that would
result in citing 55 sources for general managers and fifteen sources for each president of baseball
operations. Instead, I will cite one of the Wikipedia pages, and an example source.8 9 Some of the
general managers and presidents of baseball operations were fired mid-season, so I visited those
teams’ season data to accurately determine the wins and losses the executives accounted for.10
Baseball playoff results are well documented with multiple online sources available for
such information. The variables “playoff berth” and “World Series wins” are available on
Wikipedia and sourced through multiple sources. I will cite these as I cited the general managers
and presidents of baseball operations.11 Baseball teams can qualify for the postseason by either
winning their division or by obtaining the best record in their league outside of the division
winners, a.k.a. winning the Wild Card. These two categories are located on the same Wikipedia
page.12
The variables “Annual Attendance,” “Franchise Value,” and “Annual Team Salary” are
used in my first empirical analysis section. These three variables are derived from three separate
sources as this information is not as abundant as team statistics and World Series victories.
Baseball Chronology holds the annual franchise valuations from 2000 to 2006.13 They cite
Forbes for the actual valuation of said franchises. I used Statista, also citing Forbes, for annual
franchise valuations from 2007 to 2016.14 Statista has a page for each team’s valuations

“List of San Francisco Giants owners and executives.”
Haft, Chris. “Bochy, Sabean extend contracts; GM moves up.”
10
“2007 Boston Red Sox Schedule.” Baseball Reference.
11
“List of World Series Champions.” Wikipedia.
12
“Major League Baseball division winners.” Wikipedia.
13
“MLB Franchise Valuations.” Baseball Chronology.
14
“Arizona Diamondbacks franchise value from 2002 to 2017 (in million U.S. dollars).” Statista.
8
9
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separately; I will cite one such page. I obtained annual attendance from a different website. 15
Finally, I obtained data for each team’s annual team salary online from a different source who, in
turn, cites The Associated Press, a nonprofit news agency.16
All data in the second empirical regression describes each MLB team’s statistics on an
annual basis. This information is available, by year, online at Baseball Reference.17

“MLB Ballpark Attendance.” Ballparks of Baseball.
“MLB Team Payrolls.” Steve The Ump.
17
“2016 MLB Team Statistics.” Baseball Reference.
15
16
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IV.

Empirical Analysis: General Managers and Presidents of Baseball Operations
When analyzing transactions on a baseball team, there are three main executive positions:

The owners, The presidents of baseball operations, and the general managers. There are other
executive positions in the front office that the owner oversees, like the director or vice president
of finance, the human resources director, and the ticket office accountant,18 but none of them
contributes to drafting and trading baseball players. The owners are the heads of the 30 MLB
teams. Often taking titles like Chairman or Chief Executive Officer,19 the owner is responsible
for overseeing the entire operation of the franchise. He (there are currently no female general
managers or presidents of baseball operations in the MLB) is responsible for hiring other
executives to oversee parts of the franchise, including hiring the baseball executives. As such,
the owner does not contribute directly to baseball operations, he simply hires a team, led by
either a president of baseball operations or a general manager, to put together a roster of players
and adjust that roster as necessary.
i.

Owners
Owners do not play a pivotal role in the construction of a MLB team. They are largely

only responsible for providing a checkbook while simultaneously devoting their time, energy,
and creativity into marketing, stadium improvement or building, and working with other owners
to change rules.20 They are much more focused on the business side of baseball. Literature on
baseball owners has supported this claim. For example, “Pay and Performance in Major League
Baseball” is an economic journal that focused on the baseball strike in the 1970s and the revenue

“Front Office.” Baltimore Orioles.
“Front Office.” Baltimore Orioles.
20
Wine, Steve. “Baseball owners look at rule changes to speed up game.”
18
19
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players lost out on during that strike. It discussed the owners’ ability to control the revenue
stream to players and determine how much money players as a union would receive,21 but there
is no mention of owners directly trading players. Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, and
American Baseball to 1920 tells a similar story, focusing on how owners emerged victorious in
the labor-management battle.22 This book portrays the owners’ checkbooks as more important to
the sport of baseball than the owners themselves. Therefore, literature has concluded that owners
are most beneficial when paying for talent.
The only time owners have been considered to impact directly the signing of baseball
players has been during instances of collusion. “Financial Restraint in the Free Agent Labor
Market for Major League Baseball: Players Look at Strike Three” examines how owners stood
together to unfairly impact the free agent market during off seasons in the 1980s. The paper
asserts that after the 1985 and 1986 seasons, “owners once again boycotted the free agent
market.”23 It concludes that the owners successfully altered the salary of the free agent pool with
collusion: “the mean ratios were 28% lower for the unweighted ratios and 38% lower for the
weighted ratios. This outcome suggests that the free agents in 1985 and 1986 did suffer
economic consequences.”24 Once again, literature suggested that owners are not directly
involved in winning baseball games. They impact the general market for players, hire baseball
executives, and provide as much money as they can afford to help the team do better.
Owners frequently hire executives from successful teams to try to gain an upper hand on
the competition. The wealthier owners in bigger markets are more capable of recruiting and

21

Scully, Gerald W. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball."
Burk, Robert F. Never Just a Game: Players, Owners, and American Baseball to 1920.
23
Bruggink, Thomas H., and David R. Rose. “Financial Restraint in the Free Agent Labor Market for Major League
Baseball: Players Look at Strike Three.”
24
Bruggink, Thomas H., and David R. Rose.
22
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paying for talented executives than other teams, furthering their inherent competitive advantages.
There is no salary cap when it comes to paying either players or baseball executives. It seems
unlikely that smaller market teams with limited payrolls would be able to compete in this
environment.
ii.

General Managers & Presidents of Baseball Operations
General managers and presidents of baseball operations perform very similar tasks and

are, fundamentally, the same position. Not every team has a president of baseball operations. In
fact, that title was recently created by many teams to “promote” their general managers to a
higher position and offload some of their travel and workload by bringing on another executive
as the general manager. For example, in 2015, the Oakland Athletics “promoted general manager
Billy Beane to the role of executive vice president of baseball operations. Additionally, David
Forst [was] promoted from assistant general manager to the role of general manager.”25 While
the Athletics are a small market team with a small budget compared to other MLB teams, Beane
led them to numerous winning seasons and playoff appearances. The Athletics were rewarding
him for this success. This move did not drastically alter the roles of the two men: Beane was still
in charge of Forst and had the last say in transactions that the team wanted to make. However,
these types of promotions are becoming more popular in baseball to retain assistant general
managers and prevent them from “seeking other general manager vacancies elsewhere.”26
Fundamentally, president of baseball operations is a clever title created by owners to keep as
many highly skilled executives in one front office as possible. The former assistant general
manager also signs a more lucrative contract with the same team, receiving pay comparable to

25
26

Adams, Steve. “Athletics Promote Billy Beane, David Forst.”
Adams, Steve.
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other general managers in the league. Presidents of baseball operations are paid even more. For
example, Theo Epstein recently signed a five-year extension with the Cubs worth more than $50
million.27
Michael Lewis’s Moneyball shed light on the evolution of baseball statisticians like Bill
James but, more importantly, focused on how Major League teams began using statistics to find
valuable players when other teams undervalued them. The Oakland Athletics, led by general
manager Billy Beane, were first to employ this tactic.28 As a small market team with a
comparatively lacking budget, they lost many great players following the 2001 season (Jason
Giambi, Johnny Damon, Jason Isringhausen)29 to teams that could pay more for them. Beane
employed Bill James’s statistics to acquire undervalued players and create a successful team
despite a lacking budget. This tactic contradicted previous scouting techniques that largely based
their evaluations on eyeballing a player and determining if he was exceptional based upon
individual scout’s knowledge of the game. Mathematics cut through the biased eye of numerous
scouts, instead creating a universal system which omitted individual flaws. Since Beane’s 2002
season, other general managers have employed similar tactics to evaluate players. However,
current statistics, advanced as they are, are not capable of predicting teams’ records perfectly.
Upper management can still make bad trades and panic when players are injured. Some general
managers and owners are better at recovering from losses than others. My study will attempt to
rank the general managers and, through a case study, show the variance in their ability to
construct successful teams.

Phillips, Ryan. “Theo Epstein, Cubs Agree to Massive Five-Year Extension.”
Lewis, Michael.
29
Lewis, Michael.
27
28

16

There have been many articles written on the effectiveness of general managers in many
sports, however they have not provided empirical evidence to support their claims. Articles
referencing the savvy of general managers have referenced their teams’ records, playoff
appearances, and longevity at their position.30 Some articles list basic facts such as “average
player spending” without providing any analysis into executive behavior whatsoever.31
Additionally, they do not go into detail regarding the specific moves made (save for one or two
major moves). Baseball, unlike other sports, has numerous minor league levels and hundreds of
players at those levels and in the majors. Players who fail to produce are sent down and other
players take their place. Trades are executed when injuries occur in a 162-game season, longer
than any other sports season. The length of the season means that more trades must be executed
as more players are sent down and called up from the minors, than any other sport. My study will
examine the effectiveness of general managers not only for their one major success or failure, but
also for their win totals and success given their budget. It will determine which executives have
more success than others and attempt to explain why.
Presidents of baseball operations for organizations that have them are the equivalent of
general managers for teams that do not have the position. The proof is in the regression: 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 =
𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒: 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢.

30
31

Davidoff, Ken. "Ranking Baseball's Top 10 GMs -- Yes, Cashman Makes the List."
Smith, Chris. "The NBA's Best and Worst GMs: Wins vs Payroll."
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DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Wins in a Season

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Presidents of Baseball
Operations (dummy

-0.076
(1.119)

variable)
The regression reveals that having a president of baseball operations does not directly correlate
with winning or losing more games. Instead, it affirms that “general manager” and “president of
baseball operations” are merely titles. If a team has a president of baseball operations, that man
oversees running the organization, making trades, drafting prospects, and evaluating talent. If a
team does not possess a president, the general manager assumes those duties.
General managers32 can be ranked through numerous variables. An owner of a baseball
team visualizes success through wins, the cost of a team, and the profitability of the team
(attendance, profit, franchise value). However, general managers are tasked with creating a roster
and pipeline of future players and crafting a winning team in the short and long run with the
budget their owner provides. Baseball, unlike other sports, has no salary cap. Therefore, teams
are free to pay as much money as they can to sign or trade for players that will contribute directly

32

For this thesis, I will refer to the senior baseball executive in all organizations as the general manager unless
contrasting the two positions.
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to the team’s success. This provides an unfair advantage for teams with more money. The
equation utilized is 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑡𝑒𝑎𝑚 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑦) + 𝑢.
DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Wins in a Season

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Total Team Salary
(Dollars)

9.11e-08
(1.19e-08)

The r-squared value for the regression is 0.1040, with 509 total observations. This indicates that
approximately 10% of the variance in games won annually results from the amount of money
paid to players in that year. This may not seem like much, but 10% of a 162-game season is
sixteen games, more than enough to propel a team into the playoffs or prevent them from
qualifying. For example, the New York Yankees consistently have one of the top three budgets
every year.33 They have won 26 World Series, sixteen more than the second team. While part of
this success stems from the fact that the Yankees are one of the oldest teams in baseball history,
their payroll has allowed them to enjoy success to this day, appearing in the playoffs in thirteen
years since 2000.34

33
34

“MLB Team Payrolls.” Steve The Ump.
“New York Yankees.” Wikipedia.
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Differences in salary between different teams directly impacts the expected win total of
those teams, but the two variables “number of wins” and “cost per win” are the most efficient
way to measure the capability of general managers. They are tasked by their owners to win as
many games as possible because winning regular season games directly improves various other
aspects of the franchise. Winning baseball games directly correlates with playoff appearances,
World Series titles, attendance, and franchise value.
First: winning baseball games correlates with playoff appearances and World Series
titles. This is a self-explanatory regression as teams that show success in the regular season are
more likely to qualify for a postseason berth. The two regressions below show the correlation
between the two variables. The two equations are, respectively: 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑡ℎ = 𝑎 +
𝑏1(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢 and 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1(𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠) + 𝑢.
DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Playoff Berth

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Wins

0.028
(0.001)

DEPENDENT

(1)
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VARIABLES

World Series
Wins

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Wins

0.003
(0.0007)

Both variables are strongly correlated with winning baseball games. The numbers indicate that
winning more baseball games improves a team’s chances of making the playoffs and winning the
World Series. The odds of a team making the playoffs is higher than winning a World Series
(larger coefficient) because winning games in the regular season does not necessarily correlate to
winning in the postseason. However, teams that are more successful in the regular season do
have a higher chance of winning the World Series because generally, if they are successful in the
regular season, they should not crumble in the postseason. Winning games in the regular season
does directly correlate to making the playoffs, as reaching the playoffs is determined by the
number of games won in the regular season.
Additionally, winning baseball games directly correlates to ballpark attendance and the
franchise value for that season. This supports that the public enjoys watching teams that win
more games. If a team is succeeding, people are more inclined to attend the game, buy
merchandise, or watch the game on television, positively affecting the two dependent variables
of the next two regressions. Other factors contribute to the franchise value of the team, like
market size and stadium capacity, but general managers can only control winning and losing.
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DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Annual
Attendance

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Wins

28985.29
(2338.17)

DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Franchise Value
(millions of
dollars)

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES

Coefficient
(Standard
Deviation)

Wins

6.75
(1.65)

The r-squared for attendance is significantly higher than the r-squared for the value of the
franchise (.2323 compared to .0319). This means that 23% of the variance in attendance is
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explained by wins. General managers cannot force people to purchase tickets. They can only
incentivize them to purchase tickets by putting together an exceptional team that wins many
games.
General managers can only control how many games a team wins by forming a good or
bad team. Their budget directly impacts their ability to do so. Therefore, there are two different
ways to rank general managers and presidents of baseball operations: By overall win percentage,
highest to lowest; and by dollars spent per win,35 lowest to highest. Since 2000, there are 54
general managers who have been at a general manager position for more than 486 games (or
three seasons).36 I eliminated all general managers who had fewer than 486 games from the lists
as they have not had enough time to directly affect the team through the MLB draft.
Additionally, fewer games means a higher sample error. There are some men who are included
in both the general manager and president of baseball operations lists. These two lists are
separate instead of combined because teams with general managers and presidents of baseball
operations would effectively possess twice as many people in the same list. The following lists
rank the general managers and presidents of baseball operations (separately) by the two above
categories.

Annual team payroll divided by wins. Sources: “MLB Team Payrolls” & “2016 MLB Team Statistics.” (and every
year since 2000)
36
General manager data. See section III: Data Review.
35
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General Managers Ranked by Total Win Percentage: 2000-201637
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

37

General Manager
Brian Cashman
Theo Epstein
John Schuerholz
Tony Reagins
John Mozeliak
Dan Evans
Billy Beane
Dan Duquette
Jerry Dipoto
Bill Stoneman
Ned Colletti
Frank Wren
Walt Jocketty
Ruben Amaro Jr.
Brian Sabean
Gerry Hunsicker
Jon Daniels
Kenny Williams
Andrew Friedman
Mike Rizzo
Bill Smith
Omar Minaya
Alex Anthopoulos
Tim Purpura
Chris Antonetti
Joe Garagiola Jr.
Jim Hendry

Win Percentage
0.578068264
0.575308642
0.566358025
0.564197531
0.55829904
0.549382716
0.544444444
0.538800705
0.538271605
0.537037037
0.537037037
0.535273369
0.53433642
0.533950617
0.53127572
0.528395062
0.527745072
0.526331428
0.516759659
0.513888889
0.510688859
0.506858711
0.50308642
0.502057613
0.501234568
0.501028807
0.500353586

General manager data. See section III: Data Review.

Rank
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

General Manager
J.P. Ricciardi
Sandy Alderson
Jed Hoyer
Mark Shapiro
Larry Beinfest
Ben Cherington
Dave Dombrowski
Ed Wade
John Hart
Kevin Towers
Neal Huntington
Doug Melvin
Josh Byrnes
Michael Hill
Dayton Moore
Dan O'Dowd
Jack Zduriencik
Jim Bowden
Dan O'Brien
Rick Hahn
Jim Beattie
Bill Bavasi
Dave Littlefield
Andy MacPhail
Jeff Luhnow
Allard Baird
Chuck LaMar

Win Percentage
0.49537037
0.494855967
0.490740741
0.490740741
0.487654321
0.486111111
0.485907559
0.483333333
0.481481481
0.481222216
0.476944508
0.472222222
0.472222222
0.470017637
0.466891134
0.464381832
0.46031746
0.452380952
0.448559671
0.447530864
0.444444444
0.443209877
0.433127572
0.431216931
0.427160494
0.41255144
0.397119342
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General Managers Ranked by Dollars Per Win: 2000-201638
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

38

General Manager
Larry Beinfest
Allard Baird
Dave Littlefield
Chuck LaMar
Andrew Friedman
Billy Beane
Jim Bowden
Jim Beattie
Dan O'Brien
Gerry Hunsicker
Jeff Luhnow
Michael Hill
Neal Huntington
Mark Shapiro
Kevin Towers
J.P. Ricciardi
Josh Byrnes
Bill Stoneman
Dan O'Dowd
Chris Antonetti
Doug Melvin
Dayton Moore
Ed Wade
John Schuerholz
Joe Garagiola Jr.
Walt Jocketty
Kenny Williams

Dollars Per Win
491232.0105
597081.8311
599917.8052
600055.0631
633862.5917
651562.2751
678068.6372
738873.513
748048.6813
749021.005
763683.9402
791144.7968
811585.3163
815195.9781
841787.8498
865718.2015
867096.6901
879985.4356
921665.7272
929491.1567
949384.3326
964380.1303
983058.7151
994932.768
1006681.92
1008057.995
1012155.535

General manager data. See section III: Data Review.

Rank
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

General Manager
Jed Hoyer
Bill Smith
Tim Purpura
Andy MacPhail
John Hart
Frank Wren
Brian Sabean
Dan Evans
Dan Duquette
Jon Daniels
Omar Minaya
Alex Anthopoulos
John Mozeliak
Sandy Alderson
Dave Dombrowski
Mike Rizzo
Jack Zduriencik
Jim Hendry
Tony Reagins
Bill Bavasi
Theo Epstein
Rick Hahn
Ned Colletti
Jerry Dipoto
Ruben Amaro Jr.
Brian Cashman
Ben Cherington

Dollars Per Win
1030201.873
1056217.302
1064513.529
1074882.979
1089298.323
1096713.474
1116330.649
1127056.127
1139500.651
1154498.132
1168669.14
1174478.349
1185868.929
1202146.676
1219459.058
1248206.524
1258356.851
1285934.85
1291120.406
1361092.724
1397594.747
1480164.223
1480764.141
1633336.969
1876824.688
1986885.557
2189739.966
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Presidents of Baseball Operations Ranked by Total Win Percentage and Dollars Per Win: 2000-201639
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

President of Operations
Stan Kasten
Terry McGuirk
John Schuerholz
Jon Daniels
David Montgomery
Mike Rizzo
Mark Shapiro
Paul Dolan
Theo Epstein
Dave Dombrowski
Andy MacPhail
Larry Dolan
Larry Beinfest
Dayton Moore
Reid Ryan

Win %
0.59414
0.53858
0.53527
0.52537
0.52510
0.51389
0.50123
0.49559
0.49383
0.49208
0.48236
0.47942
0.46708
0.46689
0.44907

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

President of Operations
Reid Ryan
Larry Beinfest
Paul Dolan
Mark Shapiro
Larry Dolan
Dayton Moore
Stan Kasten
Terry McGuirk
John Schuerholz
Andy MacPhail
Mike Rizzo
David Montgomery
Theo Epstein
Dave Dombrowski
Jon Daniels

Dollars Per Win
678918.5616
744442.1364
765774.1401
929491.1567
930513.5999
964380.1303
977751.9504
1012113.586
1096713.474
1099657.316
1248206.524
1286632.833
1320991.174
1446968.138
1604597.54

In reviewing these lists, the main aspects that stand out are that most successful general
managers like Theo Epstein and Brian Cashman rank very high in overall wins and almost last in
dollars per win. This shows that salaries impact wins more than 10%. The highest general
manager win percentage is 0.578 while the lowest is 0.397, representing an average of 92 wins
and 64 wins per season, respectively. Sixteen games of this 28-game difference are accounted for
by differences in salary. Therefore, the difference in salary accounts for approximately 57% of
the total difference in wins between the highest and lowest general managers. Only one general
manager ranks in the top ten in both lists: Billy Beane of the Oakland Athletics.
The rest of the variance in winning games and the season to season success of the team is
determined by annual team statistics. There are many statistics in baseball attempting to analyze
players and teams, all to answer whether the player or a team will win more games. Batting
39

President of Baseball Operations data. See section III: Data Review.
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average, home runs hit, on base percentage, walks, etc. are all statistics that are believed to be
indicative of performance. The next section of empirical analysis analyzes statistics by team to
determine which statistics are important, if there is a type of team or player that is better than
others, and which statistics baseball executives use to improve their teams.
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V.

Empirical Analysis: The Importance of Team Statistics
General managers utilize statistics now more than ever to determine which players to

draft. The following regressions depict team statistics from 2000 to 2016 and are designed to
highlight a problem. There are too many statistics in the MLB and many of those statistics are
meaningful for an individual player while simultaneously not being correlated to winning
baseball games when examined on a team level. These regressions will show which team
statistics general managers focus on when constructing a team. They analyze team statistics like
these, observe their team’s weaknesses, and acquire players to counteract these shortcomings.
There have been numerous articles written on baseball statistics and the often-times
misleading story they tell with regards to the genuine value of players. Bill James was credited as
a leading member in the baseball statistics industry back in the 1970s when he began publishing
annual books titled The Bill James Baseball Abstract.40 These books revolutionized baseball
statistics that were, at the time, primitive. James invented new statistics by combining existing
statistics into weighted equations that, ultimately, produced a more in depth analysis of players’
overall value.41 James published works constantly, and his revised Abstract in 2001 introduced a
complex formula designed to rank and evaluate baseball players based upon one number: win
shares.42 This number resulted from taking all known metrics used to evaluate players and,
through mathematical equations and weighing different statistical categories appropriately, arrive
at a single number. I will not be using Bill James’s model in my research; I will be constructing
my own model using common baseball statistics found on Baseball Reference43 to construct an

40

James, Bill. The Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.
James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.
42
James, Bill. The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract.
43
"Baseball Reference." Baseball-Reference.com.
41
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efficient model. This attempt will not be as efficient as Bill James’s model as he had access to
much more data over a longer period, but my data will be from 2000 to 2016, enough
observations to qualify as a large sample size. This will allow me to analyze the modern baseball
game, which has changed since the 1970s with the introduction of modern technology, weight
training, and a reduction in steroid use. Additionally, James and these other sources focused
more on individual player statistics,44 45 while my model focuses on team statistics. Many teams
currently utilize statisticians who have borrowed from Bill James to gain the upper hand on the
competition, drafting and trading for players that may not appear to be talented based on basic
statistics like batting average and runs batted in.46 47
Different teams play in different stadiums and climates, and these external factors play a
key role in how upper management builds a team. For example: the Colorado Rockies play at
high altitude in Denver, where the thin air allows the ball to travel farther. Naturally, the Rockies
sign and draft more power hitters than contact hitters or pitchers as better power hitters in that
environment generate more runs. Conversely, the San Francisco Giants play right next to San
Francisco Bay, where the weather is foggy, the air heavy, and the wind fierce.48 They focus more
on dominant pitching and fast, athletic hitters to help on defense and try to get on base instead of
hitting home runs. Studies have been conducted regarding the productivity of teams and the
effectiveness of hitting in various stadiums. One such study ranked stadiums in the American
League (half of Major League Baseball) according to batting average on balls in play. 49

44

John Thorn and Pete Palmer. The Hidden Game of Baseball.
Keri, Jonah. Baseball Between the Numbers: Why Everything You Know About the Game Is Wrong.
46
Lewis, Michael.
47
Gabriel B. Costa, Michael R. Hubber and John T. Saccoman. Understanding Sabermetrics: An Introduction to the
Science of Baseball.
48
I have attended and watched many Giants game.
49
"Determining How Ballparks Affect Batter's Ability to Create Hits." Packer Intersections.
45
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However, this data has not been incorporated into a more comprehensive model that considers
other factors to determine a team’s ability to win. Additionally, the study did not factor in the
types of hits (single, double, triple, home run) into the equation, treating these equally when they
indicate different types of hitters (singles indicate less power, home runs indicate the most). The
case study comparing Theo Epstein to Dan O’Dowd and the variables “home runs hit” and
“home runs surrendered” utilize the concept of stadium environmental impacts to explain general
managers’ decisions. This allows for a more in depth analysis of upper management’s actions
with regards to types of players drafted and traded for.
i.

First Regression: Annual MLB Team Statistics
The regression shown below is an examination of annual MLB statistics from all 30

teams from 2000 to 2016. Its r-squared score is 0.8851, indicating that 88.51% of the variance in
annual wins is explained by the variables in this model. Out of the 22 variables used in the
model, only six are statistically significant at the ninetieth percentile or higher (and are bolded
and italicized): Runs scored, home runs, strikeouts by hitters, hit batsmen, hits yielded by
pitchers, and runs scored against pitchers. The equation for the regression is as follows: 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 =
𝑎 + 𝑏1 (𝐵𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟 ′ 𝑠 𝐴𝑔𝑒) + 𝑏2 (𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑) … + 𝑏22 (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) + 𝑢
DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Wins in a Season

INDEPENDENT

Coefficient

VARIABLES

(Standard
Deviation)

Batters’ Age (Avg)

0.191
(0.187)

Runs Scored

0.070

30

(0.016)
Hits

0.011
(0.015)

Home Runs

0.037
(0.010)

Stolen Bases

0.005
(0.008)

Caught Stealing

0.025
(0.027)

Walks

0.012
(0.015)

Strike Outs (Hitters)

-0.005
(0.002)

Hit Batsmen (Hitters)

0.035
(0.020)

Double Plays Hit

-0.002
(0.020)

Sacrifice Hits

0.002
(0.010)

Sacrifice Flies

0.016
(0.026)

Runners Left on Base

-0.007
(0.015)

Pitchers’ Age (Avg)

0.128
(0.164)

Hits Allowed

0.010
(0.005)

Runs Allowed

-0.103
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(0.007)
Home Runs Allowed

-0.015
(0.011)

Walks Allowed

-0.005
(0.012)

Strike Outs (Pitchers)

0.002
(0.006)

Hit Batsmen (Pitchers)

-0.002
(0.016)

Balks

0.058
(0.071)

Wild Pitches

0.014
(0.016)

Strike Outs to Walks Ratio

0.673
(2.57)

Observations
R-squared

510
0.8851

The variable “hit batsmen” will be discussed in depth after the last regression, but it was
statistically significant in this regression. It had a p-value of 0.035, statistically significant at the
ninetieth percentile. The coefficient for batters hit by pitches was 0.098, meaning that for every
additional batter hit, the expected number of wins for that team rises by 0.098.
The variable “walks” will be discussed after the last regression. It was statistically
significant in this regression, with a p-value of 0.057, statistically significant at the ninetieth
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percentile. The coefficient for walks was 0.068, meaning that for every additional walk drawn,
the expected number of wins for that team rises by 0.068.
The variables hits allowed and runs allowed will be discussed after the third regression
and compared to their counterparts: hits and runs allowed compared to the major-league average
and the difference between hits and runs scored versus hits and runs allowed by team. The two
variables were both statistically significant in this regression, with p-values of 0.076 and 0,
respectively (runs allowed had a t-statistic of -14.57). Hits allowed, surprisingly, had a positive
correlation with winning, meaning that teams that surrendered more hits won more games. The
coefficient for hits allowed is 0.010, meaning that for each additional hit surrendered, the
expected win total of that team increased by 0.010 wins. The coefficient for runs allowed is 0.103, meaning that for each additional run allowed, the expected win total of that team
decreased by .103 wins.
Strike outs by batters is statistically significant in this regression, while strike outs by
pitchers is not statistically significant. This dichotomy will be addressed after the last regression.
This variable will be compared to the strike out variables in the next two regressions. Here
though, strike outs by hitters has a p-value of 0.024 and is statistically significant at the ninetyfifth percentile. The coefficient is -0.005, meaning that for every additional strike out by a hitter,
the team’s expected win total decreases by 0.005 wins.
ii.

Second Regression: Annual Team Statistics Against the Annual MLB Average
The vast majority of the variables generated in regressing wins with seasonal baseball

statistics are not significant. Only a few variables stood out as statistically significant, limiting
the relevance and correlation of many statistics. Baseball, like every other sport, is relative. A
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team could have a high batting average in 2001 and see that average drop in 2016, indicating that
that team’s hitting ability has decreased. However, the sport changes annually and evolves over
time, making the lower batting average in 2016 potentially relatively higher than the higher
batting average in 2001. The early 2000s were part of the “Steroid Era,” a time in which steroids
ran rampant throughout MLB, increasing hitters’ power and home runs as a result. Home runs
have decreased since 2000, potentially making them not significant when only analyzed by their
quantities annually. However, when these same team statistics (including home runs) have the
MLB average for that season subtracted from them, the changing trends in baseball are
eliminated and the results show which statistics are more important. The following equation and
regression factor in annual changes in overall statistics by subtracting the MLB average from
each variable:
𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1 (𝑅𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑢𝑛𝑠 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑) + 𝑏2 (𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠) …
+ 𝑏21 (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜)
+𝑢

DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Wins in a Season

INDEPENDENT

Coefficient

VARIABLES

(Standard
Deviation)

(all variables subtract the
league average from them)
Runs Scored

0.003
(0.009)

Hits

0.072
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(0.010)
Home Runs

0.050
(0.010)

Stolen Bases

0.007
(0.008)

Caught Stealing

-0.047
(0.027)

Walks

0.070
(0.009)

Strike Outs (Hitters)

-.006
(0.002)

Hit Batsmen (Hitters)

0.090
(0.018)

Double Plays Hit

-0.061
(.017)

Sacrifice Hits

0.005
(0.011)

Sacrifice Flies

0.023
(0.026)

Runners Left on Base

-0.061
(0.011)

Hits Allowed

0.011
(0.006)

Runs Allowed

-0.105
(0.007)

Home Runs Allowed

-0.015
(0.012)

Walks Allowed

-0.003
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(0.012)
Strike Outs (Pitchers)

0.003
(0.006)

Hit Batsmen (Pitchers)

0.005
(0.017)

Balks

0.028
(0.072)

Wild Pitches

0.012
(0.017)

Strike Outs to Walks Ratio

1.06
(2.74)

Observations
R-squared

510
0.8801

Of the 21 variables utilized in the statistics versus the major-league average regression,
ten of them were statistically significant at the ninetieth percentile (and bolded/italicized above):
Hits, home runs, runners caught stealing, walks, strike outs, double plays, hit by pitches, runners
left on base, hits allowed, and runs allowed. The number of statistically significant variables has
almost doubled from the previous regression, indicating that accounting for changing tendencies
and strengths in the MLB shows that certain factors are, in fact, highly significant. The r-squared
value for this regression is close to the r-squared value of the annual team regression, at .8801.
The r-squared value indicates that 88.01% of variance in wins is explained by this model.
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Runners caught stealing is a statistically significant variable in this regression with a pvalue of 0.084. The coefficient for caught stealing is -0.047, meaning that for each additional
runner caught stealing above the major-league average, the expected win total of that team
decreases by 0.047. Bases stolen is not a statistically significant variable, meaning that
attempting to steal a base can only negatively affect a team’s expected win total based on the
above regression. This is only true on average, as many exceptional base stealers have
contributed to wins provided they steal far more bases than times caught stealing.50 Getting
caught attempting to steal a base turns a single or a walk into another out, effectively preventing
hitters from hitting with men on base. Each additional out reduces the team’s chances of scoring
each inning, preventing teams from winning games as a result.
Hitting into a double play is statistically significant when compared to the major-league
average, with a p-value of 0. The coefficient is -0.061, meaning that for each additional double
play on the hitter’s side when compared to the average number of double plays, the expected
number of wins for that team decreases by 0.061. Double plays were not statistically significant
in the previous regression, indicating that teams across the MLB hit into different numbers of
double plays every year, perhaps more in some years than in others.
Double plays are turned when there is a runner on first base; singles and walks are the
most common way to get a runner to first base. Indeed, these two variables are correlated with
double plays (r-squared=.3146):

50

“Billy Hamilton.” Baseball Reference.
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DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Double Plays

INDEPENDENT

Coefficient

VARIABLES

(Standard
Deviation)

Hits

-0.015
(0.013)

Singles

0.125
(0.017)

Stolen Bases

-0.165
(0.023)

Walks

0.038
(0.010)

Teams that hit for a high batting average but lacking in power can score runs if they successfully
hit consecutively, but they often run the risk of hitting a ground ball with a runner on first base,
resulting in a double play. Hits are not correlated with double plays as teams that hit for power
avoid this dilemma. Teams can offset this problem by featuring singles hitters who also possess
speed (negative correlation between stolen bases and double plays). These runners can steal
bases, eliminating the force out at second base and preventing double plays. They also possess
enough speed to potentially run fast enough to reach second or first base before the double play
can be turned. This data would serve to counter the results of the variable stolen bases, perhaps
suggesting that speed is more significant than the insignificant stolen base variable suggests.
Hits, home runs, walks, strike outs (hitters), hit batsmen (hitters), runners left on base,
hits allowed, and runs allowed are statistically significant in this regression at the ninetieth
percentile and will be discussed after the final regression. For each of the variables, the
coefficient indicates that for each additional instance of each of the variables compared to the
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MLB, the expected win total for the team rises by the coefficient number. The coefficients are as
follows: hits=0.072, home runs=0.050, walks=0.070, strike outs (hitters)=-0.006, hit batsmen
(hitters)=0.090, runners left on base=-0.061, hits allowed=0.011 and runs allowed =-0.105.
iii.

Third Regression: Comparative Team Statistics
The regression below takes all the variables that exist on both the offensive and defensive

side and compares them to each other. Here is an example: the 2000 Atlanta Braves had 1490
hits while surrendering 1428. Therefore, in this equation the Braves number for the 2000 hits
difference is 62. The formula for this equation is as follows:
𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1 (𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 − 𝑤𝑎𝑙𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡) + 𝑏2 (ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 − ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡)
+ 𝑏8 (𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠 − 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑏𝑦 ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠) + 𝑢

DEPENDENT

(1)

VARIABLES

Wins in a Season

INDEPENDENT

Coefficient

VARIABLES

(Standard
Deviation)

Walks Drawn Minus
Walks
Allowed
Hits Minus Hits Allowed

0.015
(0.006)
0.006
(0.007)

Batters Hit Minus Pitchers
Hitting Batsmen
Home Runs Minus Home
Runs Allowed
Intentional Walks Minus
Intentional Walks Allowed

0.035
(0.012)
0.019
(0.007)
0.033
(0.011)
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Difference in Runners

-0.013

Left on Base

(0.007)

Runs Minus Runs
Allowed
Difference in Strike Outs
(Pitchers-Hitters)

Observations
R-squared

0.083
(0.007)
0.005
(0.002)

510
0.8824

The only variable in this regression that was not statistically significant was the
difference between hits for the team versus hits surrendered by the team. All seven other
variables were statistically significant at the ninetieth percent level. Not only that, most
significant variables were significant at the ninety-ninth percent level, indicating that these
variables are extremely correlated to winning baseball games. The r-squared and adjusted rsquared for this regression were .8825 and .8807, respectively, indicating that 88.25% of the
variance in wins was explained in this model. While this r-squared score is close to those of the
two previous regressions, this model explains the art of winning is more than hitting and pitching
statistics or hitting and pitching statistics when compared to the MLB average: The variables in
this regression are more significant and, in some cases, show that relativity, not the statistic
itself, is statistically significant.
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Walks
Walks were not statistically significant in the MLB regression on the hitter’s or pitcher’s
side, nor were they significant on the pitcher’s side when compared to the major-league average.
However, walks were significant for hitters when compared to the major-league average or the
teams versus the MLB average regression. This indicates that a team that draws more walks or
surrenders fewer walks is not necessarily more likely to win baseball games, unless the number
of walks drawn exceeds the MLB average. This suggests that only substantial advantages in
walks translates into wins.
In the last regression, the difference between walks drawn and walks surrendered was
statistically significant with a t-score of 2.4. The variable is statistically significant at the 95th
percentile. The coefficient was 0.0145, meaning that for every additional walk drawn than
surrendered, the expected number of wins for a team in one season increased by 0.0145. This
regression indicates that walks are a relative variable; they can only become significant when
compared between a team’s hitters and pitchers. According to the model, if a team drew 100
walks and surrendered 80, the resulting expected win total would be the same as if a team drew
50 walks and surrendered 30 in a season. The difference of 20 walks drawn versus surrendered
directly correlates to winning more baseball games (in this case, it would increase the expected
win total of a team by 20 times the coefficient of 0.0145, resulting in an increase of 0.29
expected wins). Leadoff walks are more directly correlated with scoring runs and winning
baseball games, with 38% of leadoff walks scoring and an average of 0.905 total runs scoring in
that inning.51 This is much higher than the average number of runs scored per inning: 0.506.

51

Dewan, John. “The Dreaded Leadoff Walk.”
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General managers are starting to recognize the efficiency of a baseball player and team
that draws many walks; prior to the Oakland Athletics and Billy Beane in the early 2000s,
baseball players who drew walks were considered inefficient and unwilling to swing the baseball
bat and hit their way on base.52 A walk is the same as a single in terms of their outcomes: the
hitter goes to first base in both situations. The only difference between the two is that in order to
single, a hitter must put the ball in play that avoids the nine defenders long enough for him to
reach first base successfully. A hitter draws a walk when the pitcher makes a mistake and throws
four balls to him. This outcome guarantees one base, while hitting a ball results in the batter
being out approximately 74% of the time.53
Since 2000, pitchers have thrown more strikes to avoid allowing these hitters to reach
first base for free (see graph below). General managers have recognized that as hitters become
more disciplined and refuse to swing at pitches outside the strike zone, general managers must
react and sign and draft pitchers who throw more strikes than in years past. The decrease in total
walks since 2000 is the result of pitchers throwing more strikes and forcing hitters to either put
the ball in play or strike out.

52
53

Lewis, Michael.
1 minus average MLB Batting Average. Source: see section III: Data Review. Annual team statistics.
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Total Walks By Team: Annually
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R² = 0.1453

While disciplined hitters have been getting signed more and more, hitting a baseball successfully
or choosing to take a pitch is usually more difficult than throwing consistent strikes. Baseball
hitters do not hit for a higher average than .400 and rarely do they reach base successfully (hit,
walk, or hit by pitch) higher than 50% of the time. The average on base percentage for a hitter
since 2000 is .328, indicating that pitchers succeed at getting hitters out far more often than
allowing them to reach base. Therefore, pitchers can impact the total number of walks more than
hitters can. General managers recognize that a low number of walks yielded, combined with a
higher number of walks drawn, directly correlates with winning. As a result, they consciously
target players that will improve this difference, especially strike-throwing pitchers.
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Intentional Walks
Intentional walks are a subsection of walks and are more statistically significant in the
regression than walks. Intentional walks has a p-score of 0.004, statistically significant at the
ninety-ninth percentile. The coefficient for intentional walks is 0.033, meaning that for every
additional intentional walk drawn by a team or every fewer intentional walk issued by as team’s
pitchers, the expected win total for that team increases by 0.033. Since the Steroid Era,
intentional walks have been issued more and more in pressure situations late in games, providing
an extra runner in impactful situations and thus directly improving the team’s odds of winning. I
chose not to include them in the previous two regressions as it is strongly collinear with walks;
however, I wanted to include intentional walks in the hitters minus pitchers’ regression as they
tell an interesting story, not only for their correlation to victories, but also to the evolution of
baseball since 2000.
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The Steroid Era saw a dramatic increase in power hitters, defined as hitters who were hitting
more doubles and home runs than any player since that period. Steroids added great physical
power to hitters. Since 2002 when the MLB began officially testing for performance enhancing
drugs,54 power hitting has declined.55 Power hitters are sometimes intentionally walked by
pitchers in key situations (example: two outs and runners on second and third) because pitchers
and managers fear that they will hit a home run or a double, scoring the runners on base. For
example, this tactic was constantly used in 2004 for Barry Bonds of the San Francisco Giants to
limit his impact on the game.56 After Bonds and numerous other Steroid Era power hitters
retired, intentional walk numbers decreased, leaving a more objective view of the intentional
walk as a tool only to be used against decent hitters in key situations. Intentional walks are
directly correlated with winning because they are only used when the team is on the brink of
scoring runs and the opposite can be said about yielding intentional walks. The difference
between the two is correlated with winning because of this logic.
Home Runs
Home runs were significant in both previous regressions, with p-values of 0 in both. In
this regression, the p-value of home runs versus home runs allowed was 0.006, statistically
significant at the ninety-ninth percentile. The coefficient was 0.0190, meaning that for every
additional home run hit when compared to home runs allowed, the expected number of wins for
that team increased by .0190. The previous two regressions showed that home runs might be

“Historical Timeline: History of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Sports.” ProCon.
See: paragraphs discussing home runs (pages 44-47).
56
Barry Bonds hit 73 home runs in 2001 and currently has the most home runs of all time. The green dot in the
graph “Intentional Walks by Team: Annually” is the intentional walk statistic for the San Francisco Giants in 2004.
Of the 153 intentional walks drawn by Giants hitters in 2004, Bonds had 120 (sources: “Barry Bonds.” Baseball
Reference. And seasonal MLB statistics: “2016 MLB Team Statistics.” Baseball Reference.).
54
55

45

statistically significant on their own, but this regression confirmed that hitting more home runs in
a season than a team surrenders is very strongly correlated with winning more games. Much like
the difference in walks and walks allowed, hitting 50 home runs and surrendering ten home runs
on a season has the same impact on expected wins as hitting 70 home runs and surrendering 30.
To accomplish this goal, general managers strive to sign and draft pitchers who do not surrender
many home runs while simultaneously targeting hitters who do hit home runs. If the general
manager signs pitchers who allow a very small number of home runs, they do not have to sign
incredibly powerful hitters and are instead freed up to potentially target other important pieces.
Additionally, ballpark dimensions and environmental factors can drastically adjust the number of
home runs surrendered by pitchers. Home runs fly out of Coors Field in Colorado far more often
than in San Diego due to stadium dimensions, climate, and altitude.57 General managers are
trying to win as many games as possible, and increasing the difference between home runs hit
and allowed will increase the expected number of wins in a season.
While the variable home runs hit is statistically significant in all three regressions, home
runs allowed by pitchers was not statistically significant in the annual team regression nor in the
team minus the MLB average regression. This can be explained through studying the dimensions
of major league ballparks and how general managers react to said dimensions and environmental
conditions. General managers build their teams in a way that plays to their stadiums’ strengths.
They do this because half of their team’s games are played at home, meaning that possessing an
advantage in their own stadium is advantageous in 82 games per year. If general managers built
their team to succeed in the average MLB stadium, their home field advantage would evaporate.
An example of a team’s success in utilizing these conditions is the New York Yankees in 2016.
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The Yankees surrendered 214 home runs during that season, higher than the major-league
average of 187 home runs surrendered, yet they won 84 games and lost 78.58 They surrendered
119 of those home runs while playing in Yankee Stadium, 55% of their total home runs
surrendered.59 Yankee Stadium surrendered 43 more home runs than the average major league
stadium, making it the stadium with the second highest total of home runs in baseball.60 This
occurs because the dimensions of Yankee Stadium allow for more home runs than most other
stadiums. The stadium is 314 feet down the right field line and 318 feet down the left field line,
shorter than most other stadiums.61 Teams that come into Yankee Stadium hit more home runs
there than they do in most other ballparks because of these dimensions, yet the Yankees still won
more baseball games than they lost. Yankee’s general manager Brian Cashman can draft and
sign hitters with more power to take advantage of these favorable dimensions. He would be more
inclined to sign and draft left-handed power hitters as the stadium is slightly shorter in right field
(home run hitters tend to pull the baseball), but this difference of four feet is not large enough to
warrant a drastic over-drafting of hitters from one side. He cannot, however, sign and draft
pitchers who give up fewer home runs than others. Pitchers fundamentally do not have a direct
impact on the number of home runs they give up. They can only impact how hard the ball is hit
consistently through throwing strikes and keeping the ball away from the center of the plate
where the hitter can hit the baseball hard. If a hitter puts a good swing on the baseball, the
destination of the baseball is determined by the hitter’s power, not the pitcher’s ability.
Therefore, pitchers in smaller MLB stadiums are bound to surrender more home runs while
giving up relatively similar overall run numbers when compared to pitchers in larger stadiums.
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Home runs in the MLB have declined in number since 2000. This can be attributed to an
increase in competent pitchers or a shift in hitter tendencies, but it’s more likely due to the
decline of steroid use in baseball since 2000. This decline shifted suddenly in 2016, when home
runs increased by “13.8 percent” from 2015 and “more than 33 percent” in 2014.62 Many
pitchers speculated in 2016 that executives of the MLB altered the properties of the baseball
itself to make the baseball travel further, causing the boost in home runs to increase the sport’s
popularity.63 Despite this sudden upward shift and the downward trend before it, the correlation
between home runs hit and wins remains intact, as does the correlation between net home runs
and wins.

R² = 0.0426
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Hit Batsmen
Hit batsmen (hitters), hit batsmen compared to the MLB, and hit batsmen minus batters
hit by pitchers are variables that are statistically significant in their respective regressions. The
last variable has a p-value of 0.004, statistically significant at the ninety-ninth percentile. Its
coefficient is 0.035, meaning that for every additional net hit batsmen (batters minus pitchers),
the expected win total for that team increases by 0.035. Getting hit by a pitch has the same effect
as drawing a walk or singling: the hitter advances to first base. Each additional baserunner can
potentially score on a double or a triple, or a single if two runners are on base or the baserunner
successfully steals second base. Batters constantly lean into pitches and refuse to move when the
ball is approaching them. They know that if they are hit, they have done their job and reached
base safely. On the flipside, pitchers are wary of hitting batters. General managers can draft and
sign hitters who stand close to home plate and pitchers with better control to positively affect
their net hit batsmen statistic.
Runs
The objective of baseball is to score more runs than the other team to win games. That is
the most important number in any baseball box score, and it is reflected in the three regressions,
with runs scored when compared to the MLB average being the only non-significant of the runrelated variables. The difference between runs and runs allowed possesses, by far, the largest
coefficient of all the comparative variables, with a value of 0.083 and a p-value of 0, as expected.
This suggests that teams that score more runs than they allow win many more games than they
lose, with each additional net run resulting in a 0.083 expected win increase. This net run
differential can be achieved by both low and high scoring teams.
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Runners Left on Base
Runners left on base is statistically significant for hitters when compared to the MLB
average and when hitters left on base subtracts pitchers leaving runners on base. It represents the
number of runners stranded on base when the inning ends (example: one runner is left on base if
there is a runner on second and the batter strikes out to end the inning). The coefficient for the
latter is -0.013, meaning that every additional runner left on base or one less runner stranded by a
pitcher, the expected win total of that team decreases by 0.013. Teams score by getting on base
in succession or by hitting home runs. If teams get runners on base consistently but fail to score,
the hit by the player on base becomes irrelevant with respect to the final score. Therefore,
pitchers who can give up a hit in an inning and prevent consecutive hits surrender fewer runs
than those who allow consecutive hits.
Strike Outs
Teams with hitters who strike out more than other teams are correlated with losing
records. The first two regressions show that hitters need to put the ball in play to increase their
chances of victory, and this logically makes sense. Striking out prevents the defense from
making a mistake on a hit ball and prevents the ball from avoiding the defenders for a hit.
Reducing strike out numbers allows for numerous outcomes on a ball put in play, while striking
out eliminates all possibility of the hitter reaching base. Additionally, the last regression shows
that teams which combine low strike out totals by hitters and high strike out totals by pitchers are
more likely to win ballgames even though high strike out totals by pitchers alone does not
translate to more wins. The p-value for net strike outs is 0.001, statistically significant at the
ninety-ninth percentile. Its coefficient is 0.005, meaning that for every additional net strike out
(pitchers minus hitters) the expected win total for that team increases by 0.005.

50

Hits
The difference between hits and hits allowed by a team is the only non-significant
variable in this model. This indicates that the difference between hits and hits allowed is
fundamentally not necessary to win ballgames even though hits allowed by a pitcher are
statistically significant in the previous two regressions and hits are statistically significant when
compared to the major-league average. Giving up more hits as a pitcher, logically, would suggest
that the pitcher is surrendering more runs. However, teams that hit for a higher average tend to
hit for less power. Home run hitters tend to strike out more and hit for a lower average because
they are swinging as hard as they can to drive the ball out of the stadium. Pitchers that yield more
hits, in turn, yield fewer home runs and therefore, fewer runs in general, correlating to a higher
win total. Additionally, teams that surrender more hits also possess hitters who score more runs
as a unit.
Ultimately, these three regressions show that baseball games are won and lost in different
ways. Teams can be successful with a balance of decent pitching and hitting. They can put more
effort and money into hitters than pitchers or invest heavily in pitching and defense. Many
individual statistics were significant in one regression and not in the other regressions, indicating
that they are not directly correlated to winning ballgames. This means that there is no universal
statistic that correlates with winning. A team with phenomenal hitting statistics like home runs
and walks is expected to lose games if their pitching staff allows higher numbers in those
categories.
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VI.

Case Study: Comparing and Analyzing Theo Epstein & Dan O’Dowd
The efficiency of executives and the team statistics fail to show the day to day and season

to season adjustments upper management make to put their team in the best position to succeed
every year. This case study will develop a more complete picture of team construction at the
hands of upper management. It will contrast two executives: Theo Epstein during his time with
the Boston Red Sox and Chicago Cubs, and Dan O’Dowd of the Colorado Rockies. Theo Epstein
is regarded as one of the top executives in baseball,64 having won three World Series since 2002,
tied with Brian Sabean of the San Francisco Giants for the most out of any general manager in
that span.65 Dan O’Dowd, on the other hand, began with the Rockies as general manager in 2000
and had a losing record in eleven of his fifteen seasons. The transactions of these two general
managers will be analyzed to answer the question: why has Theo Epstein succeeded more than
Dan O’Dowd?
i.

Theo Epstein
Theo Epstein’s first World Series victory came in 2004, when the Boston Red Sox had a

record of 95 wins and 67 losses. His predecessor, Dan Duquette, was not a “bad” general
manager, with a win percentage with the Red Sox of .534 from 2000 to 2002. New Red Sox
owner John W. Henry sought a better than average ballclub when writing one of the largest
annual salary checks in baseball. Henry fired Dan Duquette and replaced him with Theo
Epstein.66 It is important to note that the Red Sox won the World Series in 2004 only two years
after Duquette’s dismissal. Epstein may have guided the Red Sox to the title, but Duquette was
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responsible for drafting and acquiring many of the players on the 2004 Red Sox roster.67 68 69 70
These players were young or developing into talents at the time of Duquette’s firing, indicating
that Duquette was, perhaps, more responsible for the Red Sox championship run than Epstein.
Nevertheless, Epstein made numerous moves before and during the 2003 and 2004 seasons to
put the Red Sox over the top and claim their first World Series since 1918.71
Epstein made three key offseason acquisitions, two before the 2003 season and one
before the 2004 season, to strengthen the Red Sox team. In January of 2003, Epstein signed free
agent designated hitter David Ortiz72 to a one year, $1.25 million contract, and purchased first
baseman Kevin Millar73 from the Florida Marlins, signing him to a two-year deal worth about $5
million.74 These two players combined to hit 59 home runs while batting .301 and .297,
respectively.75 David Ortiz drew 75 walks and Kevin Millar drew 57. Epstein signed these two
hitters to improve the hitting numbers for the designated hitter and first base positions, two
positions where it is essential to have good hitters.76 First basemen for the Red Sox hit thirteen
home runs in 2002 and had a combined batting average of .237, while designated hitters hit 25
home runs and batted .298 in 2002.77 Kevin Millar clearly improved the first base statistics, but
David Ortiz’s addition was more impactful than an additional thirteen home runs and .003
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batting average. Ortiz allowed Manny Ramirez to return to the field (Ramirez served as the
designated hitter in 51 games in 200278), creating an additional power hitter in the lineup instead
of replacing a similar caliber hitter.
These hitting transactions provided support in the overall Red Sox hitting statistics,
improving them from 2002 to 2004. As asserted in the data analysis section, hitting more home
runs directly correlates with winning more games. Additionally, an increase to walk totals and a
decrease in strike outs also correlate with winning games. Kevin Millar and David Ortiz
improved these statistics for the Boston Red Sox. Net walks increased from 115 in 2002 to 212
in 2004. Net home runs also increased by 32. The Red Sox did strike out 200 more times in 2004
than in 2002, but this increase was offset by the increase in walks drawn and the 50 run increase
(32 net). Epstein took note of the Red Sox’s need for more competent power hitters in 2002,
addressing the situation two months after being appointed general manager. The acquisition of
David Ortiz and Kevin Millar addressed this need for power, helping the existing hitters towards
a title in 2004.
Finally, Epstein acquired starting pitcher Curt Schilling79 before the 2004 season for
Mike Goss, Casey Fossum, Brandon Lyon, and Jorge De La Rosa.80. This transaction directly
addressed the issue of poor starting pitching for the Red Sox. Schilling had a strong season,
pitching a team high 226.2 innings, winning 21 games, and posting an earned run average of
3.26.81 Additionally, Schilling started four of the postseason games for the Red Sox, winning
three of them and posting an earned run average of 3.28.82 Epstein acquired Schilling after the
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2003 season because the Red Sox started two pitchers in 2003 who averaged over five runs
allowed per nine innings pitched.83 Epstein’s desire to eliminate this weakness led him to trading
minor league prospects for Schilling.
The Red Sox pitching stats improved from 2003 to 2004 because of this transaction.
Team runs allowed per game decreased by 0.25, the Red Sox earned run average decreased by
0.30, walks allowed per inning decreased by 0.2, and the ratio between strike outs to walks
increased by 0.19.84 These positively impacted statistics correlated to winning: Increasing net
walks by 80, minimizing the negative net strike out difference, and improving net runs by 29
from 2003 to 2004.85 Schilling’s brilliance in 2004 shed a positive light on the strategies of
Epstein. Epstein observed that the Red Sox were on the verge of making a deep postseason run,
possessing depth at hitting and a few talented pitchers. They only needed one more excellent
starting pitcher. The Red Sox only won three more games in 2004 than 2003, well within the
margin of statistical error. However, starting pitchers showcase their value more in the
postseason than the regular season. Teams drop their fifth and, sometimes, their fourth starter in
the postseason to throw their best three pitchers once every three games instead of once every
five (postseason games usually occur once every other day, while games during the regular
season occur daily). Schilling’s numbers during the postseason resembled those he produced in
the regular season, only he was pitching more often. Thus, his contribution to Red Sox wins
increased in the postseason. Epstein’s trade for Schilling directly contributed to the Red Sox
winning the World Series in 2004.
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When working for the Red Sox, Epstein had major advantages that few other general
managers possessed. His budget in 2004 was over $125 million dollars, $57 million more than
the MLB average and the second highest in baseball. His budget during the 2009 Red Sox
championship season was $122 million dollars, $33 million above the MLB average and fourth
highest in baseball.86 Epstein’s success as a general manager is somewhat qualified by this unfair
advantage. However, Epstein lost this advantage once he left the Red Sox for the Chicago Cubs
after the 2011 season.87 The 2016 championship Chicago Cubs had a salary of only $116 million
dollars, $5 million dollars below the MLB average and fourteenth overall. This proves that
Epstein is capable of winning baseball games without paying excessively for top talent. He
traded for and drafted young talent for the Cubs, talent who developed into cheap, productive
players in the Cubs’ 2016 season.88 89
While Theo Epstein possessed many valuable players and had the means to acquire and
pay top free agents when he took over as Red Sox general manager, his task in rebuilding the
Chicago Cubs required numerous lower cost transactions and draft picks to create a World Series
winning team. The most revealing transaction demonstrating Epstein’s savvy was his 2014 trade
with the Oakland Athletics. On July 5, the Cubs traded pitchers Jason Hammel and Jeff
Samardzija to the Athletics for pitcher Dan Straily and minor leaguers Addison Russell and Billy
McKinney. On paper, this trade appeared to be awful for the Cubs.90 They were giving up
Samardzija, a 29-year-old starting pitcher who, at the time of the trade, had a 2.83 earned run
average in seventeen starts that season91. Additionally, Jason Hammel had an earned run average
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of 2.98 in seventeen starts, lower than the MLB average in 2014. The players the Cubs were
receiving were two minor leaguers and one relief pitcher, none of whom were, at the time, as
valuable as either Samardzija or Hammel. However, Epstein had another motive to give these
two players up: His main target, Addison Russell. Samardzija and Hammel would both be free
agents after the 2014 season and Epstein believed that they were not going to re-sign with the
Cubs.92 93 The Cubs were not considered a playoff team in 2014; they posted a record of 73 and
89. With two months left in the regular season, Epstein brilliantly determined that trading for
young talent would yield better long-term results than risking losing the two pitchers to free
agency without receiving anything in return.
Additionally, Epstein bet that the two pitchers were overachieving and, by the end of the
season, would sink to their true ability. This was confirmed as Hammel posted a 4.26 earned run
average with the Athletics, while Samardzija’s was 3.14. Epstein believed that these two pitchers
were “sell-high” candidates and the Athletics bit, giving up their prized prospect Addison Russell
in exchange for these pitchers. Currently, Addison Russell is the starting shortstop for the
Chicago Cubs. He hit 21 home runs in 2016 as a 22-year-old in his second full year as a
shortstop, indicating that he has yet to reach his full potential (many players take a few years to
adjust to major-league pitching). Russell’s 21 home runs ranked seventh among major league
shortstops, only six behind the league leader.94 His contributions to the Cubs last year
contributed to their first World Series victory since 1908. Theo Epstein traded for Addison
Russell by giving up two overachieving pitchers who were only under contract for three more
months. His long-term strategy for rebuilding the Cubs was on display with this trade, showing
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his ability to recognize and improve the overall talent of the team without spending excessively
on overpriced free agents. Epstein traded for talented players ready to produce immediately
while with the Red Sox in 2003 while building for the future with the Cubs in 2014. These
different strategies highlight Epstein’s intelligence and capability as a savvy executive.
ii.

Dan O’Dowd
Dan O’Dowd was the general manager for the Colorado Rockies from 2000 to 2014. His

cumulative record as general manager for the Rockies was 1129 wins and 1302 losses. This gives
O’Dowd a win percentage of .464, losing more games than winning in eleven of the fifteen
seasons (O’Dowd has since been replaced by Jeff Bridich, who remains at the position). O’Dowd
had only one successful season,95 leading the Rockies to one World Series appearance in 2007.
His losing ways over a fifteen-year span indicate that O’Dowd failed in his mission to internally
develop a competitive baseball team, while the Rockies as an organization did not possess
enough funds to compete for free agents with teams like the Yankees and Red Sox.
O’Dowd’s budget during his fifteen years with the Rockies averaged $14 million dollars
below the MLB average. While the Rockies’ budget increased, other teams’ budgets increased
even faster. In 2000 and 2001, O’Dowd had $5 million dollars more to spend than the MLB
average, but starting in 2002 onwards, every Rockies team was paid collectively less than the
MLB average. This lack of funds contributed to an increasingly mediocre ballclub. It also
contributed to O’Dowd keeping his job for so many years despite mediocre results. The owners,
brothers Dick & Charlie Monfort, were realistic in their expectations for the Rockies’ level of
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success given their budget. With less money than other teams, O’Dowd had an inherent
disadvantage when signing expensive talent or making blockbuster trades.
The Colorado climate and environment also negatively impacted O’Dowd’s ability to
sign or trade for starting and relief pitching. The Rockies play in Coors Field, a stadium located
in Denver, Colorado.96 Denver is approximately one mile high, making it the highest altitude
MLB city by far.97 This reduces the gravity and air resistance on the baseball drastically when
the ball is hit and thrown, allowing it to travel much further than in any other ballpark while
reducing the movement of sliders and curveballs.98 Power hitters have enjoyed great success at
Coors Field because of this phenomenon. However, pitchers refuse to consider Colorado
because, in their minds, pitching at Coors Field half of the season would negatively affect their
statistics. For example, in 2016 pitchers at Coors Field gave up 215 home runs, the third most in
the National League and seventh in baseball.99 No pitcher is going to view statistics like these
and conclude that he could be successful at Coors Field. Instead, he is going to look for ballparks
with high-density air, closer to the ocean, so the ball does not travel as far and has more
“movement.” Additionally, he will track how big each of the ballparks are and pick one of the
bigger ones to allow fewer home runs. On the flip side, hitters, particularly hitters with power,
are more inclined to play for the Rockies. After a few seasons of hitting many more home runs
than they could possibly hit in other stadiums, these power hitters would stand to make more
money in new contract negotiations. Therefore, O’Dowd’s only available strategy was to create a
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team that had tremendous hitters, with just enough decent pitching to keep the team in relatively
higher scoring games, all on a modest budget.
This style of team is precisely what O’Dowd created during his years with the Rockies.
Over his tenure, the Rockies averaged 4.95 runs per game and gave up 5.11 runs per game.100
Both numbers were significantly higher than the average 4.56 runs scored and runs allowed per
game in that period. Net runs is a statistic that is very significantly correlated with expected win
totals. The Rockies allowed more runs than they scored from 2000 to 2014 on average, resulting
in losing records in eleven of the fifteen seasons. O’Dowd failed in his task to create consistently
competitive playoff teams.
O’Dowd made numerous trades between 2000 and 2014, attempting to improve his team
with every transaction. The most significant decline in talent occurred between 2007 and 2008,
when the Rockies went from playing in the World Series to winning only 74 games and finishing
third in their division.101 The team went from hitting 171 home runs in 2007 to just 160 in 2008.
The team’s on base percentage (hits plus walks plus hit by pitches, divided by plate appearances)
decreased from .354 to .336. The Rockies walked 52 times fewer in 2008 than 2007 and were
walked intentionally fifteen times fewer in 2008. This decrease in offensive efficiency was
compounded by poor pitching: The Rockies pitchers walked 58 more hitters in 2008 compared to
2007.102 This eliminated the net advantage the Rockies possessed in walks, a net advantage that
strongly correlates with winning. After the 2007 season, O’Dowd was not inclined to make many
moves as the Rockies had success and made it all the way to the World Series. However, after
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their decrease in statistical efficiency and win total in 2008, O’Dowd was inclined to trade for
and sign players to adjust the trajectory of the team.
After the 2008 season, O’Dowd made one significant trade, giving up all-star outfielder
Matt Holliday in exchange for Carlos Gonzalez, Greg Smith, and Huston Street.103 Smith was a
career minor leaguer who only made eight starts for the Rockies in 2010.104 However, the other
two players—Gonzalez and Street—continue to this day to be excellent. Holliday’s WAR (wins
above replacement) since the trade has been 26.1,105 meaning that he has accounted for 26.1 total
wins since 2008 when compared to an average replacement option. Gonzalez, a rookie in 2008,
has a career WAR of 22.8 since being traded to the Rockies.106 Additionally, Gonzalez is only 31
years old, six years younger than Holliday with many more years to play as Holliday approaches
the end of his career. While Matt Holliday has succeeded since the trade, his on base percentage
and home run totals decreased upon being traded to Oakland.107 They only began to increase
back to where they had been for the Rockies when Oakland traded Holliday to the St. Louis
Cardinals for minor-league prospects.108
Huston Street was the piece in the trade that dramatically improved the Rockies. Street
posted a WAR of 2.9 in the three years after his trade to the Rockies.109 Additionally, Street
improved his WAR after leaving the Rockies and going to the San Diego Padres, a team with a
stadium at sea level and close to the ocean. The ball travelled farther at Coors Field than in San
Diego, indicating that Street was a better pitcher than he showed while playing with the Rockies,
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and continue to produce for their respective teams to this day. These two players combined for a
larger WAR than Holliday’s since the trade. O’Dowd made a smart trade here, acquiring young
talent in exchange for a superstar at the end of his best years. If O’Dowd’s trade acumen was
high, he should have been able to make blockbuster trades like this more often. Unfortunately,
O’Dowd could not make more trades due to a lack of talent in the Rockies organization.
O’Dowd’s weakness is demonstrated through his ineptitude in the MLB draft. Since
2000, the only successful first round draft pick O’Dowd made was in 2005, when shortstop Troy
Tulowitzki was taken seventh overall.110 O’Dowd drafted other major league players in the first
round, including Jayson Nix, Jeff Francis and Ian Stewart.111 However, these players never
became all-stars, only average MLB players. Indeed, the only other dominant player O’Dowd
has selected in the draft was third-baseman Nolan Arenado in 2009.112 When compared to
successful teams like the San Francisco Giants, O’Dowd’s track record does not add up to
success for the Rockies. Drafting players also does not depend on salary; O’Dowd could not use
a mediocre salary as an excuse for drafting poorly. O’Dowd could not trade minor leaguers or
develop them into stars for the Rockies because he consistently drafted players incapable of
playing at the MLB level. O’Dowd’s lack of acquiring good young talent caused the Rockies to
slide into mediocrity. As older players left to sign with other teams or retired, O’Dowd replaced
them with overrated draft picks who failed to live up to expectations.
While this case study shows the moves the two general managers made to either advance
or negatively impact their team, providing deeper analysis with respect to how these general
managers evaluate talent is impossible. Baseball transactions are public, but general managers

“Daniel O’Dowd.” Baseball Reference.
“Daniel O’Dowd.”
112
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110
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take great care to keep their talent evaluation processes secret. They do this to prevent other
teams from stealing their equations, scouting methods, and ranking systems. Being an executive
for a baseball team is all about deception; if one general manager makes a trade with another,
they both believe that they swindled each other and came out on top with better players than they
previously had. The same methods are used for evaluating high school and collegiate talent.
Ultimately, general managers are tasked with looking at their team, through the “eye test” 113 and
through statistics, and determining its strengths and weaknesses. The general manager is then
charged with improving upon the team’s weaknesses, and perhaps strengths if the opportunity
arises. Theo Epstein executed his strategies while with the Red Sox and Cubs, while O’Dowd
struggled from an absence of competent pitching and draft prospects. Theo Epstein proved that
he can succeed, both in must win seasons and rebuilding periods. O’Dowd’s draft failures
doomed the Rockies to seasons of mediocrity.

113

Using one’s own eyes to determine the talent level of a prospect.
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VII.

Conclusion

This thesis made two main assertions. First, general managers and presidents of baseball
operations are judged by their victories and their success based on their budget and some are
significantly more successful than others. Second, teams can win in many ways, but certain team
statistics are strongly correlated with winning games, while some commonly used statistics are
not. Finally, these two assertions were combined in the case study of two executives: Theo
Epstein and Dan O’Dowd.
There are many ways to evaluate the success of general managers that I have not
discussed in this thesis (and would have given more time). First, general managers oversee the
MLB draft of collegiate and high school players. These players are signed to minor-league
contracts. When they reach the major leagues, they are automatically signed to the major-league
minimum for a few years with no possibility of salary negotiation. Thus, drafting many
outstanding baseball players in consecutive seasons can produce an exceptional baseball team for
a small price. I would compile a list of players drafted by general managers who proceeded to
play in the major leagues, play for more than five years, play for more than ten years, and reach
the All Star game. This would provide a different way to evaluate the success of general
managers. It could also be a stronger way to evaluate the transactional ability of general
managers. I would also create similar variables with respect to trades the general managers made,
deducting a point if they traded away a future All Star while adding a point if they acquired a
future All Star in free agency or through a trade.
The baseball team statistics considered in the regressions were treated equally for all 30
teams. This allows a fair comparison between the teams. However, general managers consider
stadium dimensions, climate, and environment when drafting or signing players. With more time,
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I would also analyze data from each team individually, considering favorable hitting or pitching
conditions given the size of the stadium and the weather and location of the city. Additionally, I
would separate the teams into American League and National League teams. National League
teams must have their pitcher hit, while American League teams can provide a designated hitter.
That hitter is paid only to hit the baseball. American League teams therefore probably put more
emphasis on hitting the baseball, as National League teams only face eight hitters and usually
one poorly hitting pitcher.
As stated in the introduction, the activity of general managers and presidents of baseball
operations provides a unique opportunity to evaluate day-to-day and year-to-year transactions
and decisions made by high-ranking executives in a company. These baseball executives provide
the opportunity to analyze operational strategy, executive decision making, and to juxtapose
successful and mediocre executives. Yogi Berra was referring to playing and managing the game
of baseball when he said the following: “Baseball is 90% mental and the other half is
physical.”114 With the recent trends in general manager skills, Berra’s statement is even more
applicable in modern day baseball than ever before.

114
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VIII. Summary Statistics
Summary Statistics: Empirical Analysis of General Managers and Presidents of Baseball Operations
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Number of General Managers
Number of Presidents
Team Payroll (Dollars)
Dollars Per Win
Franchise Value ($Millions)
Annual Attendance

55
15
510
510
510
510

8.73E+07
1077019
536.6686
2452290

4.02E+07
463109.9
429.0275
683553.3

1.50E+07
192288.5
89
642745

2.73E+08
2965098
3400
4298655

Summary Statistics: Empirical Analysis of Team Statistics
First Regression: Unmodified Team Statistics
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Hitters
Average Hitters' Age
Runs Scored
Hits
Home Runs
Stolen Bases
Caught Stealing
Walks
Strike Outs
Double Plays
Hit Batsmen
Sacrifice Hits
Sacrifice Flies
Runners Left on Base

510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510

28.87882
738.6706
1446.014
167.8686
93.96863
37.69804
521.2078
1126.559
125.8706
56.03333
50.66275
44.42941
1139.341

1.331787
83.58667
82.09656
33.78658
30.43236
10.9657
70.8465
137.8167
15.50356
13.5386
20.39039
8.637079
59.20459

25.6
513
1199
91
19
12
363
805
82
26
8
24
965

33.5
978
1667
260
200
74
775
1543
170
103
119
75
1301

Pitchers
Average Pitchers' Age
Hits Allowed
Runs Allowed
Home Runs Allowed
Walks Allowed
Strike Outs (Pitchers)
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers)
Balks
Wild Pitches
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio

510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510

28.61392
1446.014
738.6706
167.8686
521.2078
1126.559
56.03333
5.066667
52.79804
2.206922

1.412553
89.15965
88.5019
25.5433
66.35465
131.685
12.20313
2.610141
12.9202
0.4396079

25.3
1125
525
96
348
764
27
0
22
1.28

34.2
1683
974
258
728
1510
95
15
98
3.69
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Second Regression: Team Statistics Minus the Annual MLB Average (each variable is that variable minus
the MLB average)
Variable

Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Hitters
Runs
Hits
Home Runs
Stolen Bases
Caught Stealing
Walks
Strike Outs
Hit Batsmen
Sacrifice Hits
Sacrifice Flies
Runners Left on Base

510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510

0.0235294
-3.739216
-1.32549
-0.3156863
-0.1823529
-3.839216
0.0862745
0.2568627
0.0156863
-0.2117647
-2.113725

70.59272
73.97226
31.5505
29.46878
10.26314
64.53599
107.3296
12.98793
19.48955
8.213881
53.78169

-197
-208
-74
-66
-29
-245
-308
-31
-46
-22
-156

203
222
103
103
36
167
385
47
64
26
144

Pitchers
Hits Allowed
Runs Allowed
Home Runs Allowed
Walks Allowed
Strike Outs (Pitchers)
Hit Batsmen (Pitchers)
Balks
Wild Pitches
Strike Outs to Walks Ratio

510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510

-3.739216
-4.809804
-1.32549
-3.839216
0.0862745
0.2568627
0.0078431
-0.1411765
0.0412157

81.56572
78.70155
22.51164
59.08498
99.32784
11.58511
2.584512
12.42422
0.3365468

-284
-267
-74
-205
-271
-35
-5
-31
-0.75

235
214
71
160
377
42
11
45
1.27

Third Regression: Team Hitting Statistics Minus Team Pitching Statistics (exception: the variable “strike
outs” is pitching strike outs minus hitting strike outs)
Variable

Observation

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Walks
Hits
Hit Batsmen
Home Runs
Intentional Walks
Runners Left on Base
Runs
Strike Outs

510
510
510
510
510
510
510
510

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

93.83612
100.6275
16.57347
35.80316
17.51362
72.41932
105.2133
144.4463

-292
-304
-44
-96
-63
-219
-337
-459

309
344
59
107
118
219
300
355
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